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SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT
The following supplementary section is a copy of an exhibit that is
scheduled to open in the Foley Square Courthouse in Manhattan
on October 28, 1991. Sponsored by the Second Circuit Historical
and Commemorative Events Committee, the exhibit features the
deceased judges who served the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Not reproduced here, however, are the photographs and related
images that highlight their careers. The Courthouse exhibit also
includes photographs of the active court and of the senior judges.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
COLLEAGUES FOR JUSTICE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit hears appeals from decisions of the federal trial courts lo-
cated in the States of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont. His-
torically, the cases appealed to this court were concentrated in the
areas of admiralty, taxation, bankruptcy, antitrust, unfair competi-
tion, and patent, trademark, and copyright. In more modern times,
the work of the court has focused on securities, labor, civil rights,
federal crimes, commercial transactions, and the environment, as
well as on its traditional specialties.
Originally known as the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, the court convened for the first time
on June 16, 1891 in New York City. It took up its first calendar of
cases on October 27 of the same year. The court was created by the
Act of March 3, 1891, which provided for a sweeping reorganiza-
tion of the federal judicial system. It was one of nine regional
courts of appeals established by the Act, which was introduced in
Congress by Senator William Evarts of New York. The "Evarts
Act" responded to the need to relieve an overburdened United
States Supreme Court and to expedite the flow of cases in the
lower courts.
Since 1891, the number and variety of cases heard in the Sec-
ond Circuit have increased enormously. As a consequence, Con-
gress has expanded the number of judgeships from three at the
beginning to thirteen today. The judges who have performed the
court's work over the past 100 years are the subject of this Exhibit.
Each has contributed to the strength and reputation of the court.
All have worked in a spirit of mutual respect, courtesy, and collegi-
ality in the pursuit of justice. The centennial of the court is com-
memorated through this examination of their lives and labors.
Chief Senior
Judge Service Judge* Status**
William J. Wallace 1891-1907 1891-1907
(1837-1917)
Emile H. Lacombe 1891-1916 1907-1916
(1846-1924)
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Nathaniel Shipman
(1828-1906)
William K. Townsen
(1849-1907)
Alfred C. Coxe
(1847-1923)
Henry G. Ward
(1851-1933)
Walter C. Noyes
(1865-1926)
Henry W. Rogers
(1853-1926)
Charles M. Hough
(1858-1927)
Martin T. Manton
(1880-1946)
Julius M. Mayer
(1865-1925)
Learned Hand
(1872-1961)
Thomas W. Swan
(1877-1975)
Augustus N. Hand
(1869-1954)
Harrie B. Chase
(1889-1969)
Charles E. Clark
(1889-1963)
Robert P. Patterson
(1891-1952)
Jerome Frank
(1889-1957)
Harold R. Medina
(1888-1990)
Carroll C. Hincks
(1889-1964)
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1892-1902
d 1902-1907 -
1902-1917 1916-1
1907-1924 1917-1
1907-1913 -
1913-1926 1921-1!
1916-1927 1926-1
1918-1938 1927-1!
1921-1924 -
1924-1961 1939-1!
1927-1965 1951-1
1927-1954 -
1929-1969 1953-1!
1939-1963 1954-1!
1939-1940 -
1941-1957 -
1951-1980 -
1953-1964 -
)17
)21
926
927
938
951
953
954
959
939
1921-1924
1951-1961
1953-1965
1953-1954
1954-1969
1959-1963
1959-1980
1959-1964
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John Marshall Harlan 1954-1955
(1899-1971)
J. Edward Lumbard 1955-present
(1901- )
Sterry R. Waterman 1955-1984
(1901-1984)
Leonard P. Moore 1957-1982
(1898-1982)
Henry J. Friendly 1959-1986
(1903-1986)
J. Joseph Smith 1960-1980
(1904-1980)
Irving R. Kaufman 1961-present
(1910- )
Paul R. Hays 1961-1980
(1903-1980)
Thurgood Marshall 1961-1965
(1908- )
Robert P. Anderson 1964-1978
(1906-1978)
Wilfred Feinberg 1966-present
(1920- )
James L. Oakes 1971-present 1
(1924- )
Walter R. Mansfield 1971-1987
(1911-1987)
William H. Mulligan 1971-1981
(1918- )
William H. Timbers 1971-present
(1915- )
Murray I. Gurfein 1974-1979
(1907-1979)
Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland 1975-present
(1915- )
Thomas J. Meskill 1975-present
(1928- )
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1959-1971 1971-present
- 1970-1984
- 1971-1982
1971-1973 1973-1986
- 1971-1980
1973-1980 1987-present
- 1974-1980
198
989-
- 1973-1978
0-1988 1991-present
-present -
-- 1981-1987
-- 1981-present
-- 1985-present
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Jon 0. Newman
(1932- )
Amalya L. Kearse
(1937- )
Richard J. Cardamone
(1925- )
Lawrence W. Pierce
(1924- )
Ralph K. Winter
(1935- )
George C. Pratt
(1928- )
Roger J. Miner
(1934- )
Frank X. Altimari
(1928- )
J. Daniel Mahoney
(1931- )
John M. Walker, Jr.
(1940- )
Joseph M. McLaughlin
(1933- )
1979-present
1979-present
1981-present
1981-present
1982-present
1982-present
1985-present
1985-present
1986-present
1989-present
1990-present
- 1990-present
* Title 28 of the United States Code section 45 (1948) established the term "chief" for
the presiding judge. Before then, the presiding judge was called "senior."
** Judges on senior status retire from full-time service, but continue to perform judi-
cial duties. Senior judges have always played an important role in maintaining the court's
high level of accomplishment. Electing to continue in an official capacity, though retiring
from full-time service, senior judges are currently responsible for about 25% of the court's
workload.
WILLIAM J. WALLACE
William J. Wallace was born in Syracuse in 1837. He gradu-
ated from Hamilton College in 1857 and then read law in Canas-
tota. He began his career in private practice in Syracuse in 1859.
He left private practice in 1873 when he was elected mayor of
Syracuse.
Judge Wallace was appointed United States district judge for
the Northern District of New York by President Grant in 1874 and
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United States circuit judge for the Second Circuit by President Ar-
thur in 1882. As circuit judge, he presided at important trials in
every district of the circuit, and he heard appeals from the deci-
sions of the district courts.
Judge Wallace was present when the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals first convened on June 16, 1891. He served as senior cir-
cuit judge, a position now designated chief judge, from 1891 until
his resignation from the court in 1907. During his tenure on the
court, he authored 352 reported appellate opinions. In one case,
The FRI (1907), he held that the law of the place where a contract
is made governs the interpretation of the contract and the obliga-
tions of the parties. The case was one in which the court upheld a
provision exempting a shipowner from liability for the loss of a
cargo of cattle. In United States v. Eschwege (1899), Judge Wal-
lace had occasion to interpret and apply the Tariff Act of 1897 in a
dispute involving celluloid sheets polished on both sides. Judge
Wallace concluded that the sheets were subject to the duty im-
posed on finished articles, since skill and labor were involved in
their manufacture.
After leaving the court, Judge Wallace entered private practice
in New York City and continued in that endeavor until his death
in 1917. His will left $160,000 and two parcels of New York City
real estate "for the benefit and assistance of indigent children."
EMILE H. LACOMBE
Emile H. Lacombe was one of the original judges of the Sec-
ond Circuit. He was born in New York in 1846; by the time he was
seventeen, he had served in the Union Army during the Civil War
and had graduated from Columbia College. He obtained his law
degree from that institution at the age of nineteen, but his young
age temporarily barred him from beginning his legal career. As a
staff lawyer and then corporation counsel of the City of New York,
he led the legal effort to wade through the financial detritus left by
the Tweed Ring after its fall from power.
In 1887, President Cleveland appointed him a circuit judge in
New York, and he sat on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals from
the time of its creation in 1891. A true New Yorker, Judge La-
combe is said to have twice turned down a nomination to the
United States Supreme Court because he did not wish to leave
town.
Judge Lacombe had a reputation as a foe of governmental in-
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terference with property rights. In the antitrust case Great Atlan-
tic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co. (1915), he wrote:
Before the Sherman Act it was the law that a trader might reject
the offer of a proposing buyer for any reason that appealed to
him.... We have not yet reached the stage where the selection of
a trader's customers is made for him by the government.
Judge Lacombe wrote the second of the three opinions that
helped resolve the complicated labor-management dispute in
Lawlor v. Loewe (1911), known as the "Danbury Hatters" case. In
this antitrust suit brought by a factory owner against union
boycotters for conspiring to destroy his business, Judge Lacombe
determined that the issue of the union's knowledge of the conspir-
acy was a question to be resolved by the jury.
Judge Lacombe retired in 1916 and died in 1924.
NATHANIEL SHIPMAN
Nathaniel Shipman was the first judge of the Second Circuit
appointed pursuant to the Evarts Act. Judges Wallace and La-
combe, who were members of the court when it convened for the
first time in 1891, had been appointed as circuit judges in 1882 and
1887, respectively, under the old Judiciary Act of 1873. The Evarts
Act created a third judgeship, and Nathaniel Shipman was ap-
pointed in March 1892 to serve in that position.
Judge Shipman, who was from an old, socially prominent Con-
necticut family, succeeded his, cousin, William as district judge for
Connecticut from 1873 to 1892. A graduate of Yale College, he
taught jurisdiction and procedure at Yale Law School while a dis-
trict judge. Before his appointment to the bench, he was a repre-
sentative to the Connecticut legislature. Judge Shipman served on
the circuit court of appeals for ten years, retiring because of ill
health in 1902.
Judge Shipman was the author of more than 240 reported
opinions. One was Le Republique Franc aise v. Saratoga Vichy
Springs Co. (1901). In that case, the bottlers of Saratoga sparkling
water labeled their bottles by displaying prominently the term
"Vichy." Barring the use of the label as designed, Judge Shipman
wrote that the effect of the labeling was to mislead the consumer
to believe it was purchasing water originating in Vichy, France,
rather than sparkling water captured from the springs in Saratoga.
In Westinghouse Electric Manufacturing Co. v. New England
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Granite Co. (1901), the court was called on to determine the pat-
entability of a method of transmitting electricity to distant points
by utilizing alternating currents. Rejecting the defendant's argu-
ment that the invention was not patentable because the inventor
had benefitted from the use of scientific information cataloging the
failures of others, Judge Shipman held that the inventor was not
precluded from obtaining patents for succeeding in the creation of
a method of electrical transmission where others had failed.
Judge Shipman was born in 1828 in Southbury, Connecticut,
and died in Hartford in 1906.
WILLIAM KNEELAND TOWNSEND
William Kneeland Townsend was successor to Nathaniel Ship-
man as a district judge for the District of Connecticut. Like Judge
Shipman, Judge Townsend's Connecticut roots were deep, and he
studied law both at Yale and in the offices of Judge Simeon E.
Baldwin. Judge Townsend became counsel to the New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad, the enterprise that his successors on
both the Connecticut and Second Circuit benches were to spend so
much time attempting-ultimately unsuccessfully-to reorganize.
Many of the Connecticut judges on the Second Circuit have
been closely associated with the Yale Law School. Judge Townsend
taught there for many years and is buried in the Grove Street
Cemetery, across the street from the school. He was also corpora-
tion counsel for the City of New Haven for the two years prior to
his appointment to the district bench.
Judge Townsend was regarded as an expert on patent matters,
and 55 of his 141 reported Second Circuit opinions arose in patent
cases. One example is Victor Talking Machine Co. v. American
Graphophone Co. (1907), in which the court held that audio
records made of a material similar to that used in patented records
did not infringe on the patent. In that case, Judge Townsend rec-
ognized the public's interest in limiting the exclusive monopolies
granted by patents. Another example is General Electric Co. v.
Wagner Electric Manufacturing Co. (1904), in which the court
held that an electric transformer used for cooling had been validly
patented.
According to a contemporary account, Judge Townsend was
himself an inventor of sorts, "spending much of his time designing
and constructing motors." He was also the author of The New
Connecticut Civil Officer, a treatise on Connecticut practice that
(Vol. 65:937
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was first published in 1881 and remained in widespread use for
half a century.
Judge Townsend was born in New Haven in 1849 and died
there in 1907.
ALFRED CONKLING COXE
Alfred Conkling Coxe was born in Auburn, New York, in 1847.
The nephew of United States Senator Roscoe Conkling, Judge
Coxe attended Hamilton College and practiced law in Utica. In
1882 President Chester Arthur appointed Judge Coxe to the posi-
tion of district judge of the Northern District of New York. After
twenty years of service in the district court, Judge Coxe was ap-
pointed to the court of appeals, where he served until his retire-
ment in 1917. He died in 1923.
Judge Coxe was neither the first nor the last of his family to
serve as a judge in the Second Circuit. His grandfather, Alfred
Conkling, distinguished himself as United States district judge for
the Northern District of New York from 1825 until 1852. His son,
Alfred Conkling Coxe, Jr., served as United States district judge
for the Southern District of New York from 1929 until his death in
1957.
At a time when the courts were not known for their concern
for injured parties, Judge Coxe was a judicial progressive who ac-
tively sought to protect the rights of individuals against the pre-
vailing legal formalisms that barred recovery. A number of his
opinions-often in dissent-foreshadowed rulings that have be-
come staples of modern tort law. One example is Cadillac Motor
Car Co. v. Johnson (1915), in which Judge Coxe disagreed with the
majority holding that an automobile manufacturer was not liable
for injuries sustained by a person who purchased a defective auto-
mobile. The majority decision was based on the lack of a contract
between the manufacturer and the purchaser. In dissent, Judge
Coxe wrote, "The principles of law invoked by the defendant had
their origin many years ago, when such a delicately organized ma-
chine as the modern automobile was unknown." One year later,
Judge Coxe's view was vindicated in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. (1916), in which Judge Cardozo of the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that manufacturers of automobiles owe a duty of care to
third parties, notwithstanding the lack of a contract. Judge Coxe
also wrote the decision in William Wrigley, Jr. & Co. v. Grove
(1910), which rejected a claim to exclusive use of the name "spear-
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mint." He explained that a manufacturer of chewing gum could
not appropriate to itself the use of a name open for use by all man-
ufacturers who produce chewing gum with a spearmint flavor.
HENRY GALBRAITH WARD
Born in New York City in 1851, Judge Ward was a descendant
of Major General Artemus Ward, an early patriot who was com-
mander-in-chief of the Continental Forces in 1771 and a member
of the 1779 Continental Congress. Before studying law in the Phil-
adelphia law office of Richard C. McMurtrie, Judge Ward received
his A.B. in 1870 and his A.M. in 1873 from the University of
Pennsylvania.
Until he was appointed to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in 1907 by President Theodore Roosevelt, Judge Ward prac-
ticed law in New York City as a name partner in firms specializing
in corporate, railroad, and maritime law. He was an active member
of the Sons of the Revolution, serving on several of its committees
and on its Board of Managers. Judge Ward served as senior circuit
judge from 1917 to 1921 ("senior circuit judge" was the title used
until 1948 for the position now referred to as "chief judge"). He
held memberships in the Maritime Law Association of the United
States and the International Law Association. Judge Ward retired
in 1924 and died nine years later.
Judge Ward wrote one of the first cases construing the 1906
Pure Food and Drugs Act, Von Bremen v. United States (1912), in
which the court held that defendants had not violated the Act
when they sold sesame seed oil labeled "salad oil." He also wrote
the opinion in The Ada (1918), which limited the jurisdiction of
the admiralty courts in contractual matters to contracts that were
"wholly maritime."
WALTER CHADWICK NoYEs
Walter Chadwick Noyes was born in Lyme, Connecticut in
1865. A descendant of eight generations of Connecticut Yankees,
he was a graduate of Cornell University, studied law under a prom-
inent member of the Connecticut bar, and was admitted to prac-
tice in 1886. In 1895, he became a state judge and held that posi-
tion until 1907, when he was appointed by President Theodore
Roosevelt to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
One of 166 appellate opinions authored by Judge Noyes was
[Vol. 65:937
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Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. (1913), a lawsuit com-
menced by the representative of a passenger who lost her life dur-
ing the first and final voyage of the British-owned oceanliner, Ti-
tanic. Judge Noyes held that the district court properly held in
contempt the attorney who instituted the lawsuit. The attorney
had defied an order prohibiting, under a statute limiting the liabil-
ity of shipowners, the commencement of any proceedings against
the owner of the Titanic.
Judge Noyes was an expert in railroad law, a talent of which
he was able to take advantage when, in 1913, he resigned from the
court and returned to private practice. He publicly announced that
his $7,000 a year judicial salary was not enough to support his wife
and children.
- Upon his return to private practice, he became general counsel
to the Delaware and Hudson Company and also acted as a receiver
for many other railroad corporations. One of his most satisfying
legal victories was in 1917, when he represented a German ship-
owner who had been sued for failure of its vessel-the Kron-
prinzessin Cecille-to perform a voyage on the eve of World War I.
Although the Second Circuit had held the North German Lloyd
Line liable, Judge Noyes successfully persuaded the' Supreme
Court to reverse and find in favor of his client. The case was ar-
gued just ten days after the United States had declared war
against the German Empire.
Judge Noyes died in 1926.
HENRY WADE ROGERS
Henry Wade Rogers was born in Holland Patent, near Utica,
New York in 1853. He received his undergraduate degree in 1874
and law degree in 1877, both from the University of Michigan. He
became a professor at Michigan Law School in 1883 and its dean in
1886. In 1890, he became president of Northwestern University,
leaving in 1900 to teach at Yale Law School and becoming its dean
in 1903. During his tenure as dean, the law school adopted both
the case method of teaching law and the requirement of an under-
graduate degree for admission.
Appointed to the United States Court of Appeals tor the Sec-
ond Circuit by President Wilson in 1913, Judge Rogers remained
dean of Yale Law School until 1916 and continued to teach there
until 1921. He died in 1926.
A lifelong academic, "he regarded his judgeship as an honora-
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ble opportunity of teaching a larger and more mature body of
pupils than can be found in any collegiate institution, and he did it
the better because he never thought of himself as an attorney,"
according to Judge Hough.
Judge Rogers wrote nearly 500 opinions. One example is Bens
v. United States (1920), in which he helped define the double jeop-
ardy rule and held that conspiracy is a crime separate from the
crime that is the object of the conspiracy.
Judge Rogers was an ardent and active member of the*Meth-
odist Episcopal Church, vice president of the American Bible Soci-
ety, and, at the time of his death, president of the National Coun-
cil of Religion and Higher Education.
CHARLES MERRILL HOUGH
Charles Merrill Hough was born in Philadelphia in 1858. After
graduating from Dartmouth College in 1879, he read law in Phila-
delphia. He joined a Philadelphia law firm, which represented the
Pennsylvania Railroad, butmoved to New York when the firm es-
tablished a local office there. He also served in the Navy during the
Spanish-American War.
After twenty years of private practice, Charles Hough was ap-
pointed in 1906 by President Theodore Roosevelt as a United
States district judge for the Southern District of New York and
thereafter was elevated to the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit by President Wilson in 1916. He was senior circuit judge at his
death in 1927.
A prolific worker despite chronic ill-health, Judge Hough was
widely regarded as an authority on admiralty and bankruptcy law.
His expertise in admiralty law is demonstrated in such cases as
The Spica (1923), involving the commencement of a suit to recover
costs from a vessel owner for repairs performed on the vessel.
Faced with the problem of proving the cost of performing the re-
pairs, Judge Hough held that the vessel's own documents could be
introduced in evidence by the repairer to prove the cost of the re-
pair work. Judge Hough's expertise in bankruptcy matters was ap-
plied in Kennebec Box Co. v. O.S. Richards Corp. (1925), in which
he held that receivership expenses had priority over federal taxes.
Judge Hough also was the first historian of the federal courts
of the Second Circuit and their antecedents. He authored both Re-
ports of Cases in the Vice Admiralty of the Province of New York
(Yale 1925) and The United States District Court for the South-
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ern District of New York 1789-1919 (1934), the manuscript of
which was found among his papers after his death.
MARTIN T. MANTON
Martin T. Manton is known as the judge who disgraced the
Second Circuit. In 1939, he was tried and convicted for taking
bribes in exchange for his influence in the results of cases before
him. He served nineteen months in prison, was released in 1941,
and died five years later.
Born in 1880 in Brooklyn, Judge Manton graduated from Co-
lumbia Law School in 1901. After developing a successful business
law practice, he was appointed as a United States district judge for
the Southern District of New York in 1916. A circuit judge from
1918 until his resignation in 1938, he served as chief judge from
1927 to 1938. His apologists said his troubles began when he could
not divorce himself from his business affairs after becoming judge.
Before District Attorney Thomas Dewey charged him with
corrupt judicial conduct, Judge Manton was regarded as an able
appellate jurist and even was mentioned for appointment to the
United States Supreme Court. Judge Manton wrote the Second
Circuit opinion in the celebrated "sick chicken case," United
States v. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. (1935). In that case, the
court held, among other things, that provisions of the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act regulating the wages and hours of employees
unconstitutionally extended congressional power under the com-
merce clause. The Supreme Court affirmed that part of the
opinion.
JULIUS MARSHUETZ MAYER
Julius Marshuetz Mayer was born in New York in 1865 and
was educated at City College and Columbia Law School. Following
a period of private practice, he served as a special sessions judge
from 1902 to 1904 and was elected attorney general of the State of
New York in 1905. Defeated for reelection, he returned to private
practice until his appointment to the Southern District of New
York by President Taft in 1912. He served as a district judge until
1921, when he was appointed to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals by President Harding. He returned again to private practice
in 1924 and died the following year. Julius Mayer was the first
Jewish judge in both the Southern District and the Second Circuit
1991]
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Court of Appeals.
In a case pitting Macy's department store against the inven-
tors of the Victrola, Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (1924),
Judge Mayer's decision for the Second Circuit is one of the earli-
est-and still one of the clearest-explications of the elements of
antitrust damages and the manner of their proof.
Judge Mayer wrote many important decisions as a district
judge, and in that capacity decided a number of cases arising out
of the conduct of the First World War. In dismissing claims for
damages brought against the Cunard Lines following the torpedo-
ing of the Lusitania, Judge Mayer wrote in The Lusitania (1918):
The cause of the sinking of the Lusitania was the illegal act of the
Imperial German government, acting through its instrument, the
submarine commander, and violating a cherished and humane
rule observed, until this war, by even the bitterest antagonists.
LEARNED HAND
A judge for fifty years, Billings Learned Hand greatly influ-
enced the jurisprudence of the Second Circuit and the Nation.
Learned Hand was born in Albany in 1872 and died in New
'York City in 1961. He received his A.B. in 1893, his A.M. in 1894,
and his LL.B. in 1896, all from Harvard University. After twelve
years of private practice, Judge Hand served in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York from 1909 until 1924, when he was appointed to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. From 1939 to 1951, Judge
Hand was chief judge of the circuit.
His landmark opinions include United States v. Alcoa (1945),
which has been called "the high watermark of the first sixty years
of antitrust enforcement." The court held that Alcoa intentionally
achieved an illegal monopoly in the aluminum industry through
the use of unfair business practices. In Helvering v. Gregory
(1935), which Judge Friendly described as "perhaps the most fun-
damental decision in the whole field of income tax law," Judge
Hand wrote, "Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes
shall be as low as possible;.., there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one's taxes." His 1917 district court injunction prohibiting
the exclusion of the socialist newspaper The Masses from the
mails, though reversed on appeal, presaged the federal courts' pro-
tection of free speech and free press that have become a hallmark
of twentieth century constitutional law.
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Judge Hand's immense contribution to legal discourse was
achieved not only through his activities on the bench, but also
through his involvement with the American Law Institute (of
which he was a founder), his numerous articles, and his public ad-
dresses. Judge Hand's influence extended beyond the legal commu-
nity; his "Spirit of Liberty" speech to more than a million rapt
listeners in Central Park on "I Am An American Day" in 1944
stands as one of the clearest and most eloquent expositions of the
values on which this country was founded.
THOMAS W. SWAN
Thomas W. Swan was one of a succession of three deans of
Yale Law School who became judges of the Second Circuit. The
others were Henry Wade Rogers and Charles Edward Clark. Ap-
pointed in 1927, he served on the court until 1965, and as chief
judge from 1951 to 1953.
As a dean, Judge Swan helped shape an important develop-
ment in American legal thought in the early twentieth century, "le-
gal realism." The "realists" rejected what they saw as the empty
formalism of the nineteenth century; they saw law not as a search
for abstract rules but rather as a study of what decision-makers
actually do, and why.
The main diet of the federal courts during Judge Swan's ten-
ure consisted of commercial disputes, patent, copyright, tax, bank-
ruptcy, admiralty, personal injury litigation, and administrative
law decisions. Judge Swan wrote decisions in all these areas and
was regarded as one of the greatest commercial law judges. Two
examples of his reported decisions are G. Ricordi & Co. v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc. (1951), dealing with the question of the right
to make a motion picture based on the story underlying the opera,
Madame Butterfly, and NLRB v. American Laundry Machine Co.
(1945), in which Judge Swan affirmed an order of the NLRB re-
quiring an employer to notify employees by mail that it would not
take retaliatory action against them. The employer had intimated
that employees who voted to unionize would be subject to unfavor-
able employment action.
Judge Swan was born in Norwich, Connecticut in 1877 and
died in New Haven in 1975.
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AUGUSTUS N. HAND
Augustus Noble Hand was born in Elizabethtown, New York
in 1869, two-and-a-half years before his famous cousin, Learned.
He received his A.B. in 1890 and LL.B. in 1894, both from Harvard
University. Before being appointed to the Southern District of
New York in 1914 and to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
1927, he practiced law in New York.
It was not without reason that Justice Robert Jackson told
lawyers that, as between the two Hands, they should "quote
Learned but follow Gus." Judge Augustus Hand wrote nearly 800
appellate opinions. He wrote perhaps the single most influential
decision in the first thirty years of the enforcement of the federal
securities laws, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. (1952), which
held that only purchasers or sellers of securities could sue for
fraud. The issue did not reach the Supreme Court for another
twenty-three years, largely because nearly all lower federal courts
facing the issue in hundreds of reported cases in the quarter cen-
tury after Judge Hand's decision had reaffirmed Birnbaum. When
the High Court finally did address the issue, it expressly noted the
precedent established by Judge Augustus Hand. A controversial
decision authored by Judge Hand was Sacher v. United States
(1952), which upheld the contempt convictions of attorneys for
members of the Communist Party whose disruptive conduct had
interfered with their clients' trial. The decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
Judge Hand died in 1954, a year after retiring.
HARRIE B. CHASE
A native of Brattleboro and a lifelong resident of Vermont,
Judge Chase served as a judge of the Second Circuit for a quarter
century and as chief judge of the court for the year prior to his
retirement in 1954. Before his appointment to the Second Circuit,
Judge Chase had served on the Superior Court of Vermont from
1919 to 1927 and thereafter had served on the Vermont Supreme
Court. He was the youngest judge ever named to the Vermont Su-
preme Court. Judge Chase received his A.B. from Dartmouth Col-
lege in 1909 and his LL.B. from Boston University Law School in
1912.
Of his 950 published opinions, at least 170 were tax cases. One
notable tax case was Farid-es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner (1947),
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which involved the varying definitions of the term "gift" for in-
come, gift, and estate tax purposes and their effect on basic calcu-
lations. In that case, the recipient of shares of stock agreed to re-
linquish all interest in the estate of her husband-to-be in exchange
for the stock. The court held that the value of the shares of stock
for gift tax purposes would be calculated by using the value of the
stock when acquired by her.
Not all of his cases were so esoteric, however. He wrote the
decision in United States v. Hiss (1950), affirming the perjury con-
viction of Alger Hiss, and the decisions in United States v. Hall
(1949) and United States v. Green (1949), affirming the contempt
convictions of various American Communist Party leaders-Gus
Hall, Henry Winston, and Gilbert Green-for misbehavior during
their Smith Act trials.
Judge Chase died in 1969.
CHARLES EDWARD CLARK
Judge Clark's reputation is derived not only from his service
as a judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals from 1939 to
1963, and as its chief judge from 1954 to 1959, but also from his
contributions as a legal educator and procedural reformer.
From 1919 to 1939, Judge Clark was on the faculty of Yale
Law School, serving as the school's dean from 1929 until his ap-
pointment to the Second Circuit. During his tenure at Yale, Judge
Clark helped develop "legal realism," the movement that defined
law as what courts do in fact and not as an abstract body of rules.
His scholarship during this period focused on civil procedure and
property law. Noteworthy are his casebook and treatise on proce-
dure and his treatise on property law, Real Covenants and Other
Interests Which "'Run with Land" (1929).
As reporter for the committee that drafted the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Judge Clark played a major role in making
practice in the federal courts simpler, more flexible and efficient,
and, most importantly, more amenable to the demands of reason
and fairness.
Judge Clark's judicial legacy mirrors the breadth of the cir-
cuit's diverse caseload. In his more than 700 decisions, 80 concur-
rences, and 200 dissents, Judge Clark consistently searched for so-
lutions that recognized individual rights in the context of
complicated societal demands. His dissent in United States v. Jo-
sephson (1947) discloses his opposition to what he considered an
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infringement on first amendment rights by the House Un-Ameri-
can Activities Committee. Not surprisingly, his opinions on proce-
dure, such as Dioguardi v. Durning (1944), are cornerstones of
modern procedural reform.
ROBERT P. PATTERSON
Robert P. Patterson was best known as Assistant and Under
Secretary of War under President Roosevelt and as Secretary of
War under President Truman. He played a significant part in the
prosecution of the Second World War and in the military and po-
litical maneuvering in Europe following its close. Before the out-
break of the war, he served as a judge of the Southern District of
New York for nine years and on the court of appeals from 1939 to
1940.
During his brief tenure as a circuit judge, Judge Patterson
wrote fifty-eight opinions, many in the tax law area. One of his
frequently cited decisions is Housman v. Commissioner (1939), in
which he held that a testator's oral promise to pay sums of money
annually was subject to federal gift tax upon distribution of the
money.
Judge Patterson founded the firm of Patterson & Webb, now
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler, in 1922 and returned to the
firm after his service as Secretary of War. A committed public ser-
vant, Judge Patterson held the positions of president of the Prac-
ticing Law Institute and the Harvard Law School Association,
chairman of the ABA Commission on Organized Crime, and judge
on the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague.
Judge Patterson was born in Glens Falls, New York, in 1891.
He was killed in an airplane crash in 1952 upon his return to New
York City from an argument in federal court in Buffalo. He gradu-
ated from Union College in 1912 and received his law degree from
Harvard Law School in 1915. His son, Robert P. Patterson, Jr., is a
district judge in the Southern District of New York.
JEROME FRANK
One of the founders and principal practitioners of "legal real-
ism," Judge Frank was known as much for his off-bench publica-
tions as for his judicial opinions. He saw nineteenth century Amer-
ican law as ossified into a series of rigid rules, divorced from the
needs of a rapidly changing society. In Law and the Modern Mind
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(1930), he wrote, "Until we become thoroughly cognizant of, and
cease to be controlled by, the image of the father hidden away. in
the authority of the law, we shall not reach that first step in the
civilized administration of justice, the recognition that man is not
made for the law, but that the law is made by and for men." His
last book, Courts on Trial (1949), is an eloquent plea for reform in
judicial administration.
On the bench, Judge Frank was a fierce exponent of civil liber-
ties, frequently in dissent. His concurring opinion in United States
v. Roth (1956), with its remarkable appendix, was an open chal-
lenge to the Supreme Court to revisit the constitutionality of ob-
scenity legislation. The challenge failed in the short term, but it set
the terms of the ongoing debate on the constitutional law of ob-
scenity, culminating in the Supreme Court's opinion in Miller v.
California (1973).
Judge Frank was born in New York City in 1889. He was a
member of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1937 un-
til 1941, when President Roosevelt appointed him to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. He received his Ph.D. in 1910 and J.D. in
1912 from the University of Chicago. In 1932, Judge Clark ap-
pointed him as a research associate at Yale Law School, and in
1946 he joined the faculty.
Judge Frank died in 1957.
HAROLD R. MEDINA
Harold R. Medina, who died in 1990 at the age of 102, was one
of the longest serving judges in the history of the Second Circuit.
As presiding judge in the Smith Act trial of eleven leaders of the
American Communist Party, he became a controversial figure. His
trial rulings (including one holding a number of the defendants'
lawyers in contempt of court) were upheld by the Second Circuit
and by a sharply divided Supreme Court.
Judge Medina was born in 1888 and at the time of his death
was the oldest living graduate of Princeton University. He gradu-
ated from Columbia Law School in 1912 and returned there to
teach in 1915. Widely known as the teacher of the Medina Bar Re-
view Course, he prepared nearly 40,000 recent law graduates for
the New York Bar Exam from 1912 to 1942.
Judge Medina also sat as trial judge in one of the largest and
most complicated antitrust cases in history-the two-and-a-half-
year trial in United States v. Morgan (1953)-which involved
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every aspect of the investment banking industry. His 213-page de-
cision is regarded as an important description of the history, tradi-
tions, and structure of Wall Street in the mid-twentieth century.
In the court of appeals, Judge Medina continued to write about the
industry. A frequently cited case is SEC v. North American Re-
search & Development Corp. (1970), in which he held that a cor-
poration's transfer of unregistered stock constituted a "new offer-
ing" and that the issuer of the stock therefore did not fall within a
1933 Securities Act exemption for everyday trading between mem-
bers of the public.
Judge Medina was appointed by President Truman to the dis-
trict court in 1947 and was elevated to the court of appeals in 1951,
taking senior status in 1959. By the 1970's, he was sitting less fre-
quently, but at least one or two days a year.
CARROLL CLARK HINCKS
Carroll Clark Hincks was born in Andover, Massachusetts in
1889. He received his B.A. in 1911 and his law degree in 1914, both
from Yale University. He served in the United States Army in
World War I from 1914 to 1918, obtaining the rank of captain. He
practiced law in Waterbury, Connecticut and, in 1931, was ap-
pointed to the district court in Connecticut by President Hoover.
During his tenure as district judge, Judge Hincks was the first
to deal with an issue that was to occupy Connecticut federal judges
on and off for forty years-reorganizing the New York, New Haven
& Hartford Railroad. Judge Hincks's reorganization ran from 1935
to 1947 and initially was successful, but saving the railroad ulti-
mately proved impossible.
In 1953, President Eisenhower elevated Judge Hincks to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. He was active in efforts to reform
the criminal sentencing process. One of his interesting opinions is
United States v. Shaughnessy (1956), in which the court upheld
the discretion of the attorney general in the deportation of aliens.
Judge Hincks analogized the duty of the attorney general to the
duty of a sentencing judge. He wrote that the decision-maker
should "not put forth judgments from an ivory tower, shutting his
eyes to contemporary mores and public opinion."
Judge Hincks contributed to the development of the New Ha-
ven Symphony Orchestra. He retired from the court in 1959 and
died in 1964.
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JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN
John Marshall Harlan was born in Chicago in 1899. He gradu-
ated from Princeton in 1920, Balliol College (Oxford) in 1923, and
New York Law School in 1924. Thereafter, he joined the firm then
known as Root, Ballantine, Harlan, Bushby & Palmer from 1931 to
1953, with time out to serve as a special assistant attorney general
of the State of New York and general counsel of the New York
State Crime Commission. He was appointed by President Eisen-
hower to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1954 and to the
United States Supreme Court one year later. He served on that
Court until his retirement, because of ill health, in September
1971. He died in December 1971.
Justice Harlan was the grandson of the first Justice Harlan,
who dissented from the Supreme Court's "separate but equal" rul-
ing in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). He inherited his grandfather's
abiding respect for individual rights, which he mixed with a firm
belief in the limited role of the federal judiciary. Known as a
"judge's judge," Justice Harlan's greatest contribution to the de-
velopment of the law was as a Supreme Court Justice. Illustrative
of his achievement while on the Supreme Court is the decision in
Cohen v. California (1971). In a case involving the conviction of a
person who wore a jacket emblazoned with a four-letter expletive
denouncing the draft, Justice Harlan, holding that the state could
not bar the speech, wrote the frequently-quoted phrase: "[O]ne
man's vulgarity is another's lyric."
While on the Second Circuit, John Marshall Harlan demon-
strated his characteristic judicial restraint in United States v.
Shaughnessy (1954), affirming an order of deportation. In that de-
cision, he observed that judicial review of such orders is limited.
STERRY R. WATERMAN
Sterry R. Waterman was born in Taunton, Massachusetts in
1901. A graduate of Dartmouth College in 1922, he left Harvard
Law School in 1923 for employment as an Immigration Depart-
ment representative in Washington, D.C., continuing his legal edu-
cation at George Washington Law School at night. He began pri-
vate practice in St. Johnsbury, Vermont in 1926. He served as
state's attorney for Caledonia County from 1933 to 1937, as execu-
tive director of the Vermont Unemployment Commission from
1936 to 1946, and as a member of the National Conference of Coin-
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missioners on Uniform State Laws. Active in Vermont. state poli-
tics, Judge Waterman ran unsuccessfully for the Republican nomi-
nation for the United States Senate in 1946. In 1955, President
Eisenhower appointed him to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
a position he held until his death twenty-nine years later.
One of his best known opinions is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. (1968). Writing for the full court, which heard the case in banc,
Judge Waterman incorporated a broad theory that use of inside
information in trading securities was a breach of the duty owed to
the market itself, concluding that such conduct violated securities
statutes. He observed that a corporation has a duty under law to
speak truthfully in public statements concerning the sale of its
stock. He also wrote for an in banc court in Chris-Craft Industries
v. Bangor Punta Corp. (1970), in which the court established rules
governing stock manipulation during the course of a tender offer.
Noteworthy also is his dissent in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.
(1969), in which he disagreed with the majority's dismissal of a
lunch counter desegregation case. His opinion was vindicated by
the Supreme Court in 1970.
LEONARD P. MOORE
Leonard P. Moore was appointed to the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in 1957 by President Eisenhower. A graduate of Am-
herst College in 1919 and of Columbia Law School in 1922, Judge
Moore had substantial civil litigation experience in private prac-
tice, becoming a senior litigation partner at the firm now known as
Chadbourne & Parke. In 1953, he was appointed by President Ei-
senhower as United States attorney for the Eastern District of
New York, where in addition to supervising both the civil and
criminal cases of the United States, he tried major criminal cases,
including the prosecution of a former Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
Expressing his philosophy on the role of the judge, Leonard
Moore stated, "I still have the notion that cases are to decide
what's right and wrong between the particular litigants in specific
cases and therefore I try to shy away from speaking in generalities.
I have no desire to write for posterity."
Often, Judge Moore would make his points with humor as he
did in his dissenting opinion in Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v.
Wolfies Restaurant Inc. (1961). In that case, he dissented from the
majority's holding that the owners of a restaurant in Florida could
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successfully maintain a claim of unfair competition against the
owners of a Brooklyn restaurant using the same name:
Obviously, there is no competition between Wolfies (Miami) and
Wolfies (Brooklyn). If the Brooklyn College student who seeks
physical rehabilitation from his mental debilitation caused by a
two-hour examination believes that he is walking across the street
into Wolfies of Miami, he would truly be in a state of post-exami-
nation shock. Nor is it possible that a family from the midwest,
anxious to visit Wolfies, would find itself in Brooklyn instead of
Miami. Everyone gets lost in Brooklyn-but not that lost.
In addition to his judicial contributions, Judge Moore made
substantial contributions to his community. He served as trustee of
the Practicing Law Institute, the Brooklyn Law School, and the
Mystic Seaport.
HENRY J. FRIENDLY
Judge Henry J. Friendly began his distinguished legal career
at Harvard Law School, where he received his LL.B. in 1927. After
clerking with United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Bran-
deis, he entered private practice, first specializing in railroad law
and then in corporate law, becoming vice president and general
counsel for Pan American Airways in 1946.
A founding member of Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly and Cox,
Judge Friendly practiced with the firm until President Eisenhower
appointed him to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1959. He
served as chief judge from 1971 until 1973, when he assumed sen-
ior status.
An unusually prolific scholar, Judge Friendly's articles, such as
Federal Jurisdiction: A General View, The Federal Administra-
tive Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, and
The Courts and Social Policy, are cited as frequently as his opin-
ions. Also, Judge Friendly was an advisor to the American Law In-
stitute's Study of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts.
Judge Friendly authored the leading cases in varied aspects of
American law, including Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp. (1969), which involved preliminary injunctions dur-
ing contested takeovers, Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.
v. Maxwell (1972), which concerned the standard for aiding and
abetting in violation of securities law, and Corning Glass v. Bren-
nan (1963), the court's first decision under the Equal Pay Act of
1963.
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Judge Friendly was born in Elmira, New York in 1903 and
died in New York City in 1986.
J. JOSEPH SMITH
J. Joseph Smith served as a federal judge for thirty-nine years.
He was appointed in 1941 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.
He served as district judge until 1960 and as its chief judge from
1953 to 1960. In 1960, he was elevated to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, taking senior status in 1971. He
died in 1980.
Judge Smith was born in Waterbury, Connecticut in 1904 and
throughout his life remained close to his Connecticut roots. He
graduated from Yale College in 1925 and Yale Law School in 1927,
remaining at Yale for an additional year as a research fellow for
Charles E. Clark, who was then engaged in his pioneering efforts to
simplify procedure in the Connecticut courts. In 1928, he returned
to Waterbury, where he practiced law until his election to the
United States House of Representatives in 1935. He represented
the fifth Connecticut congressional district from 1935 to 1941,
serving on the House Military Affairs Committee.
During his twenty years on the court of appeals, Judge Smith
wrote more than 600 appellate opinions. He wrote leading deci-
sions in such diverse areas as sovereign immunity. One such case
was Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abasteci-
mientos y Transportes (1964), in which he held that a foreign
country may not invoke sovereign immunity when the activity sub-
ject to the lawsuit is commercial. His opinion in this case preceded
the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which
adopted that rule. Judge Smith dealt with the question of standing
to sue in a case involving a challenge to an urban renewal plan. In
Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency (1968), he wrote
that minorities, who had been displaced from their residences by
an urban renewal plan, could challenge the plan for inadequate
provision of low-income housing.
PAUL R. HAYS
Paul R. Hays was born in Iowa in 1903. He received his A.B.
in 1925, M.A. in 1927, and LL.B. in 1933, all from Columbia Uni-
versity. Associated briefly with the law firm of Cravath, Swaine
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and Moore, he joined the Columbia Law School faculty in 1936,
where he served until 1961, when President Kennedy appointed
him to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. He was a leading la-
bor mediator and vice chairman of the New York State Liberal
Party. He assumed senior status in 1974 and died in 1980.
His most famous case was Scenic Hudson Preservation Con-
ference v. Federal Power Commission, in which he issued two
opinions. The case involved a dispute over the construction of a
pumped-storage generating facility on Storm King Mountain in
the Hudson Valley. In the first opinion, written in 1965, Judge
Hays noted the "unique beauty and major historical significance"
of the Hudson valley, whose "highlands and gorges.., offer one of
the finest pieces of river scenery in the world," and concluded that
the Federal Power Commission had not given sufficient considera-
tion to the environmental issues surrounding the construction
plans. Six years later, Judge Hays assessed, on a vastly expanded
administrative record, "the conflict between the needs of a highly
technological society and the increased awareness of environmental
consideration," concluding that the correct issues had been can-
vassed by the commission and that construction could proceed.
Another important case in which Judge Hays wrote the deci-
sion is Warth v. Seldin (1974). In that case, the court upheld the
dismissal of an action brought to challenge a city's zoning prac-
tices. The ground for dismissal was the lack of standing to sue on
the part of the plaintiffs, none of whom had suffered any specific
harm.
ROBERT PALMER ANDERSON
Robert Palmer Anderson was born in Noank, Connecticut in
1906. After graduating from Yale College in 1927 and Yale Law
School in 1929, he entered private practice in New London, Con-
necticut. Before his appointment to the federal bench, Judge An-
derson was elected to the Connecticut Senate, served as state at-
torney for New London County, and for one year served as a judge
in the Superior Court of Connecticut.
In 1954, President Eisenhower appointed Judge Anderson dis-
trict judge for the District of Connecticut, where he played a major
role as trial judge in the reorganization of the bankrupt New Ha-
ven Railroad. His supervision of the railroad continued even after
his appointment to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals by Presi-
dent Johnson in 1964. Except for one point, his several opinions
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about the merger of the railroad with Penn Central were affirmed
by the Supreme Court. During his nine years on the court of ap-
peals, Judge Anderson wrote many opinions on controversial mat-
ters. His opinions in Berk v. Laird (1970) and Orlando v. Laird
(1976) involved challenges to the constitutionality of the prosecu-
tion of the Vietnam War based on the absence of a declaration of
war by Congress.
The descendant of a long line of sea captains, Judge Anderson
had a keen interest in maritime cases. At the outbreak of World
War II, he volunteered for service in the Naval Reserve and partic-
ipated in the North Africa and Normandy campaigns. During his
tenure on the bench as a circuit judge, he wrote forty opinions in-
volving maritime matters. One of these opinions, frequently cited
for its Conradesque description of wind, rain, and sea, is Esso
Standard Oil, S.A. v. S.S. Gasbras Sul (1968).
Judge Anderson assumed senior status in 1973 and died in
1978.
WALTER ROE MANSFIELD
Walter Roe Mansfield was born and raised in Boston, Massa-
chusetts, the son of Frederick Mansfield, a prominent local politi-
cian and mayor of Boston from 1931 to 1935. After graduating
from Harvard Law School in 1935, Judge Mansfield became associ-
ated with the law firm of Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, spe-
cializing in trial practice.
Judge Mansfield took a leave of absence from Donovan, Lei-
sure to serve as an assistant United States attorney from 1939 to
1941. During World War II, he entered the Marine Corps and
served in the Office of Strategic Services. He parachuted behind
enemy lines to work with partisan units in both Yugoslavia and
China, and was awarded the Bronze Star and the Legion of Merit.
Judge Mansfield was appointed to the Southern District of
New York by President Johnson in 1966, and to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals by President Nixon in 1971. As a district judge,
Judge Mansfield ruled that the New York State Athletic Commis-
sion had violated the, rights of boxer Muhammed Ali when it
barred him from fighting because of his refusal to be inducted into
the Armed Services. He also ruled that McSorley's-an ale house
in Manhattan that for 116 years served only men-must serve
women as well.
Judge Mansfield was a member of the court of appeals from
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1971 until his death in January 1987. He assumed senior status in
1981. His better known appellate opinions include United States v.
Place (1981), which held that unnecessary delay in the warrantless
seizure and examination of an airline passenger's baggage violated
the fourth amendment, and In re Bhopal (1987), which upheld a
lower court decision to transfer litigation concerning the Bhopal
disaster to India.
MURRAY I. GURFEIN
Murray I. Gurfein was born in New York City in 1907. A grad-
uate of Columbia College in 1926 and the Harvard Law School in
1930, he served as law clerk to Judge Julian Mack, as assistant
United States attorney for the Southern District of New York from
1931 to 1933, as deputy assistant district attorney during the New
York County Dewey Investigation from 1935 to 1938, and as assis-
tant district attorney from 1938 to 1942. After service as a lieuten-
ant colonel in Army intelligence and the O.S.S. from 1942 to 1945,
Judge Gurfein was an assistant to Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson
at the Nuremberg trials.
Following the war, Judge Gurfein spent over twenty years in
private practice with Orrin G. Judd, later a United States district
judge for the Eastern District of New York. Judge Gurfein was ap-
pointed in 1971 as a United States district judge for the Southern
District of New York. In 1974, he was elevated to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where he served
until his death in 1979.
Judge Gurfein will be remembered for his resolution of the
Pentagon Papers case, United States v. New York Times Co.
(1971). His refusal to stop the publication of secret government
documents by the New York Times Company was upheld by the
Supreme Court. Judge Gurfein wrote: "A cantankerous press, an
obstinate press, an ubiquitous press must be suffered by those in
authority in order to preserve the even greater values of freedom of
expression and the right of the people to know."
As a circuit judge, he also wrote opinions involving the first
amendment. In Albany Welfare Rights Organization v. Wyman
(1974), he held that members of an organization advocating the
rights of welfare recipients had a first amendment right to dis-
tribute leaflets in a welfare office.
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